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Abstract
Diﬀerent to other scientiﬁc disciplines traditional economic theory has remained
remarkably silent about procedural aspects of strategic interactions. Much to the con-
trast, among psychologists there is by now a broad consensus that not only expected
outcomes shape human behavior, but also procedures that are used to take decisions.
It is argued that procedural concerns are especially pervasive in the resolution of con-
ﬂicts. In our paper we show that procedural concerns are in fact an inherent feature of
the interaction of reciprocal agents. More precisely, using Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004)’s theory of sequential reciprocity we demonstrate that procedural choices deter-
mine the responsibility that people have for outcomes. The responsibility for outcomes
in turn inﬂuences peoples’ evaluations of intentions and, hence, subsequent reactions.
Two applications are discussed to highlight the impact and importance of procedural
concerns in strategic interactions.
Keywords: Psychological Games, Procedural Concerns, Reciprocity
JEL Classification: D01, C70
Introduction
Imagine a group of three friends. One of them has a free ticket for the local concert of their
favorite music band. Unfortunately, however, he cannot go himself, as he has an exam the
following day. As his friends love the band as much as he does, he would like to give the
ticket to one of them instead. He is indiﬀerent as to whom of the two to give it. He knows,
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however, that if one of them feels unkindly treated, he will get into a quarrel. It is easy
to see that this situation bears much resemblance to the ‘So long, Sucker’ game analyzed
e.g. by Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988). A player (A), i.e. the ticket holder, is driven to choose
an unlucky player, i.e. the friend that does not receive the ticket, out of two players (B)
and (C). Subsequently the unlucky player is allowed to choose an action which is either
kind, i.e. not quarreling, or unkind, i.e. quarreling, towards player (A). As in the ‘So long,
Sucker ’ game, it seems also here, at ﬁrst sight, that the ticket holder is trapped: By choosing
who gets the ticket he inevitably has to be unkind to one of his friends, creating the risk of
trouble. At a second glance, however, when asked how this conﬂict could be resolved, one is
intuitively driven to suggest that he should ﬂip a coin to take the decision as in this way he
avoids being unkind to either of them.
This example and our intuition of how to resolve the conﬂict eﬀectively highlight two
essential aspects of any human interaction. First, very often there are numerous ways in
which decisions can be taken. On the one hand, the friend holding the ticket could decide
to take the decision himself as to whom to give it, but, on the other hand, he could also let
chance decide by ﬂipping a coin. Secondly, one can easily see that decisions are inherently
associated with procedures which characterize the way in which they are taken. The ticket
holder, in our example, ﬁrst has to decide how he wants to take the decision before he can
eﬀectively take it.
Among psychologists there is by now a broad consensus that not only expected outcomes
shape human behavior, but also procedures that are used to take decisions [e.g. Thibaut
and Walker (1975), Lind and Tyler (1988), Collie et al (2002), Anderson and Otto (2003)
and Blader and Tyler (2003)]. It is argued that procedural concerns are especially pervasive
in the resolution of conﬂicts. Prominent examples of conﬂict resolutions are to be found
in the areas of workplace relations and the public acceptability of policies and laws. First,
psychologists have found evidence that behavioral reactions to promotion decisions, bonus
allocations, dismissals etc. strongly depend on the perceived fairness of selection procedures
[e.g. Lemons and Jones (2001), Konovsky (2000), Bies and Tyler (1993), Lind, Greenberg,
Scott and Welchans (2000) and Roberts and Markel (2001)]. Second, it has been shown that
public compliance with policies and laws strongly depends on the perceived fairness of their
enforcement procedures [e.g. Tyler (1990), Wenzel (2002), Murphy (2004), De Cremer and
van Knippenberg (2003) and Tyler (2003)].
Psychologists explain the impact of procedures on human interactions with the help of
attribution theory [e.g. Heider (1958), Kelley (1967), Kelley (1973), Ross and Fletcher
(1985)]. Attribution theory rests on the assumption that people need to infer causes and
assign responsibilities for why outcomes occur. It is argued that especially when outcomes
are unfavorable and perceptions of intention are strong, there is a tendency to assign respon-
sibility for outcomes to people. The assignment of responsibility and blame in turn has been
shown to aﬀect the occurrence and intensity of anger and aggression [Blount (1995)]. In
other words, people care about others’ intentions and reciprocate kind with kind and unkind
with unkind behavior. As procedures explicitly inﬂuence the control that people have over
ﬁnal outcomes, they obviously also inﬂuence the evaluation of responsibilities and intentions.
To exemplify, imagine a workplace situation in which a principal wants to promote one out
of two agents. If he chooses to take the decision on who is to be promoted intransperantly
behind closed doors, agents are driven to attach a high degree of responsibility for the out-
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come to the principal. His choice is interpreted as intentional, which fosters perceptions of
favoritism. If, by contrast, the principal uses a transparent procedure which credibly shows
that the decision is based on an unbiased criterion, i.e. a criterion which ‘a priori’ ensures
that both agents have the same chance to be promoted, the principal is not blamed for the
ﬁnal outcome.
In line with attribution theory Blount (1995) experimentally showed that the responder
behavior in ultimatum games is very sensitive to the way, i.e. procedure, in which a proposal
is made. In her experiments proposals in the ultimatum game were either made by a proposer
actively having a stake in the ﬁnal outcome of the game, by a neutral third party not having
any monetary stake in the ﬁnal outcome or by chance. She observed that the same proposal
triggered signiﬁcantly lower rejection rates in case a neutral third party or chance had chosen
the proposal compared to situations in which the proposal was made by a stakeholder.
According to attribution theory lower rejection rates in case of neutrality of the proposer or
explicit randomizations hint at the fact that responders attach a lower degree of responsibility
and intentionality for outcomes to other stakeholders as they do not have any inﬂuence over
proposals. In other words, the responders’ willingness to punish other stakeholders seems to
decrease the lower the others’ inﬂuence over the ﬁnal division of the pie.
Notwithstanding this experimental evidence and the fact that e.g. workplace relations
play an eminent role in the economic literature, economists have remained remarkably silent
so far about the impact of procedures on human behavior in strategic interactions. Only
three recent economic papers have started to address the issue of procedural choices in
strategic interactions [Bolton et al (2005), Trautmann (2006), Krawczyk (2007)]. In contrast
to attribution theory, however, they all extend models of distributional concerns to account
for the impact of procedural choices on strategic behavior. Bolton et al (2005) only present a
sketch of a possible model based on the model of inequity aversion by Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000). Trautmann, on the other hand, manipulates Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s model of
inequality aversion suggesting that agents’ utilities depend on ‘expected outcome diﬀerences’
‘ex ante’ as well as ‘ex post’ to any outcome realization. In the context of our introductory
example this means that even after the ﬂipping of a coin the ticket holder ’s utility depends on
the ‘ex ante’ expected outcome diﬀerence. The expected outcome diﬀerential for his friends
is lowest when ﬂipping a coin. Hence, an inequality avers ticket holder would prefer ﬂipping a
coin to any other procedure because it ensures a zero expected outcome diﬀerential. Although
Trautmann’s functional form is able to accommodate the experimental ﬁnding that rejection
rates in random ultimatum games are lower then in the standard ultimatum games, it can
only be applied to single decision situations. It cannot be applied to more complicated
strategic interactions as the calculation of expected payoﬀs needs expectations about the
other player’s play.
In contrast, our paper follows the psychologists’ view. As a main result, using psycholog-
ical game theory we show that procedural concerns are an inherent feature of the interaction
of reciprocal agents. We ﬁrst formally deﬁne the concepts of procedural game and procedure
and, secondly, use the ‘theory of sequential reciprocity’ by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) to highlight the impact of procedural choices on the interaction of reciprocal agents.
As will be shown, procedural choices determine the attribution of responsibilities and the
evaluation of intentions. Responsibilities and intentions, in turn, determine the degree of
any subsequent reciprocation. In brief, procedures are associated with explicit probability
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distributions deﬁned over pure actions. In our concert-ticket example the two pure actions of
friend (A) obviously are: i) giving the ticket to friend (B) and ii) giving the ticket to friend
(C). The ﬂipping of a coin assigns the probability 1
2
to both of them. The more skewed this
probability distribution is towards a certain pure action, the stronger the impression that
the decision maker is intentionally aiming at this outcome. At the extreme this means, if
friend (A) takes the decision directly, i.e. without explicitly randomizing, to give the ticket
to friend (B), the unlucky friend (C) assigns full responsibility and intentionality to the de-
cision of friend (A). In this situation player (C)’s kindness perceptions are obviously shaped
by the fact that player (A) has directly chosen player (B) without giving him any ‘credible’
chance to also get the ticket.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s class of sequential games does not allow for diﬀerent
procedural choices. More precisely, it only allows for one type of procedures: procedures
that imply full responsibility and intentionality. To the contrary of this, in our class of
procedural games we allow for diﬀerent procedural choices which then allows to analyze the
impact of procedural choices on strategic interactions. To exemplify, when player (A) in
our introductory example decides to take his decision by ﬂipping a coin instead of taking
the decision himself both his pure actions, i) and ii), are ‘ex ante’ equally probable. The
outcome is pure chance and, hence, no responsibility and intentionality is associated with
it. As a consequence, reciprocal agents react diﬀerently to the same outcomes, i.e. choice of
pure actions, depending on the procedure which has led to them.
To highlight this impact of procedural choices on the strategic interactions of reciprocal
agents we analyze two applications in the ﬁnal section of this paper. More precisely, we allow
for diﬀerent procedures in the ‘So long, Sucker’ game analyzed by Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988)
as well as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and the Sequential Prisoners Dilemma also
analysed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Comparing our results to their equilibrium
predictions shows that the interaction of reciprocal agents is very sensitive to the availability
of diﬀerent procedures.
Summarizing, the organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section we formally
deﬁne procedures and characterize a procedural game in which agents choose for procedures
rather than actions and strategies. In the second section we point at the impact of procedures
on the behavior of reciprocal agents. More precisely, we formally deﬁne reciprocity in the
context of our procedural game and in this way explain the impact of procedural choices
on the strategic interaction of reciprocal agents. We furthermore show that the concept
of sequential reciprocity equilibria (SRE) deﬁned by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
can also be applied to our class of procedural games in which agents choose for procedural
strategies. Finally, as said above, two applications are discussed to highlight the impact and
importance of procedural concerns in strategic interactions.
Procedures
In this section we proceed in two steps. First, we intuitively sketch our argument with the
help of two examples. In a second step we i) formally deﬁne the concept of procedures and
ii) fully characterize our class of procedural games in which agents do not choose actions
and strategies, as usually assumed in game theory, but procedures. This class of multi-stage
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games in which agents choose procedures is thenceforth used in the subsequent sections to
analyze the impact of procedural choices on the strategic interaction of reciprocal agents.
As a starting point consider games Γ1 and Γ2 in Figure 1 and 2:
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Figure 1: Game Γ1
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Figure 2: Game Γ2
The sole diﬀerence between games Γ1 and Γ2 is that in Γ2 player 1 can choose (M) on
top of his pure actions (L) and (R). Player 1’s pure action (M), however, is nothing else
than choosing an explicit randomization device, (0), assigning probabilities α2 and (1− α2)
to his pure actions (L) and (R) respectively. ‘Flipping a coin’ or ‘throwing a dice’ constitute
explicit randomization devices, for example. ‘Flipping a coin’ assigns the probability 1
2
to
both pure actions (L) and (R). ‘Throwing a dice’, on the other hand, leads to α2 =
5
6
and
(1− α2) = 16 , if, for example, (L) is chosen, whenever numbers 1 to 5 come up, and (R) is
chosen, if 6 appears. Obviously, ‘ﬂipping a coin’ and ‘throwing a dice’ are but two credible
ways in which a decision can be taken. In reality one usually disposes of many diﬀerent ways.
Nevertheless the two examples suﬃce to show how diﬀerent ways, or in our words explicit
randomization devices, are associated with diﬀering explicit probability distributions with
which an action is indirectly chosen by chance.
But not only choices like (M) can be characterized as choices for explicit randomization
devices. Taking the thought about the credible ways and the diﬀering explicit probability
distributions to the extreme shows that also pure actions like (L) and (R) can equally be
deﬁned as choices for explicit randomization mechanisms. Imagine, for example, that player
1 in Γ1 and Γ2 chooses for his pure actions (L). This is equivalent to saying that player
1 chooses for chance to take the decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability 1 to
his pure action (L). Hence, although (L) represents a pure action, it can nevertheless be
reinterpreted in a way in which the decision is indirectly taken by chance randomizing with
a degenerated probability distribution over the set {(L) , (R)}.
This shows that in our two examples, Γ1 and Γ2, any choice for a pure actions, i.e. (L)
and (R), and any choice for an explicit randomization mechanism, i.e.(M), can likewise
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be reinterpreted as a choice for an explicit randomization device through which the actual
decision is subsequently taken by chance. Consider, for example, game Γ3 in Figure 3, which
is a restatement of game Γ2 in the spirit of this intuition:
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Figure 3: Game Γ3
As one can see, in Γ3 we reformulate all strategic choices of game Γ2 into choices for
explicit randomization mechanisms, i.e. chance or player 0, through which decisions are
subsequently taken. In game Γ2 player 1 can decide between (L), (M) and (R), and player 2
can decide between (l) and (r), (l′) and (r′), (l′′) and (r′′) or (l′′′) and (r′′′) depending on player
1’s choice. Equivalently, in game Γ3 player 1, for example, has to decide between the explicit
randomization devices ω (h01), ω
′ (h01) and ω
′′ (h01) in the initial history h
0
1. First, by choosing
ω (h01) he can decide to let chance take the decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability
1 to (L). Second, by choosing ω′ (h01) he can decide to let chance take the decision between
(L) and (R) assigning probability α2 to (L) and (1− α2) to (R). Finally, by choosing ω′′ (h01)
he can decide to let chance take the decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability 1
to (R). In all these three cases player 1 only determines how chance subsequently takes
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the decision, rather then taking the decision himself. Hence, notwithstanding the formal
equivalence between games Γ2 and Γ3, an interpretive diﬀerence exists. Choosing for an
explicit randomization mechanism implies that players do not take decisions themselves.
They merely determine how decisions are taken by chance. In other words, players decide
about the procedures which are used to take decisions. The example in Figure 3, thus,
uncovers that strategic decision making is not only about choosing actions but also about
how actions are chosen. For this reason we call game Γ3 a procedural game.
This brings us to a more formal deﬁnition of our class of procedural games. Formally,
let the set of players be N = {0, 1, ..., N} where 0 denotes the uninterested player chance.
Denote as H, with the empty sequence ∅ ∈ H, the ﬁnite set of histories, h, and X the ﬁnite
set of decision nodes x, such that hx is the sequence of decisions on the path to the decision
node x. The player function, C, assigns to each nonterminal history hx ∈ H a member
i ∈ N who moves after that history hx. Therefore, let hxi be the history h on the path to
the decision node x which is controlled by player i ∈ N and Hi the set of all histories after
which player i has to move throughout the game. At each history, hxi , after which player
i ∈ N\ {0} has to move, he disposes of a nonempty ﬁnite set of pure actions A (hxi ) and a
ﬁnite set of explicit randomization devices, Ω (hxi ), through which he can choose an action
from A (hxi ). As already suggested in example Γ3 players in our procedural games do not
choose actions a ∈ A (hxi ) directly, but choose explicit randomization mechanisms, denoted
ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi ), through which a decision is indirectly taken by chance. The choice for
a speciﬁc explicit randomization device, ω (hxi ), in history h
x
i by player i ∈ N\ {0} leads
to a speciﬁc decision node v ∈ X deﬁned by hv0 in which chance takes the actual decision
using the explicit probability distribution ρ (ω (hxi )) associated with ω (h
x
i ) deﬁned on A (hv0),
with A (hv0) = A (hxi ). Hence, the choice for a pure action a (e.g. (L) in Γ2), for example,
translates in our procedural game into a choice for an explicit randomization mechanisms,
ω (hxi ), that is associated with a degenerated probability distribution ρ (ω (h
x
i )) which assigns
probability 1 to the pure action a in the set of possible actions A (hv0) = A (hxi ). The choice
for an explicit randomization (e.g. (M) in Γ2), on the other hand, is a choice for an explicit
randomization mechanism, ω′ (hxi ), that is associated with a non-degenerated probability
distribution ρ (ω′ (hxi )) deﬁned on A (hv0) = A (hxi ). As said before, the set of player i’s
degenerated as well as non-degenerated explicit randomization mechanisms in any history
hxi is Ω (h
x
i ). The associated set of explicit probability distributions is furthermore denoted
as P (hxi ), where P (hxi ) = {ρ (ω (hxi )) | ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi )}. It can easily be seen that the
minimum number of explicit randomization mechanisms that a player can decide between in
any history hxi in our procedural game equals the number of pure actions that he has in the
traditional extensive form representation.
As said before, by choosing for randomization devices players do not take decisions di-
rectly but only determine how chance subsequently takes them. Intuitively, as players only
decide on how the decisions are subsequently taken, they only decide on the procedure, which
is used to take a decision.
This brings us to a formal deﬁnition of procedures:
Definition 1 A procedure, ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi ), for player i ∈ N\ {0} in history hxi ∈ Hi is a
tuple:
〈ρ (ω (hxi )) ,A (hv0)〉 ,
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where:
1. ρ (ω (hxi )) is the explicit probability distribution associated with ω (h
x
i ) deﬁned on A (hv0)
2. A (hv0) = A (hxi ), and
3. hv0 directly succeeds h
x
i .
In example Γ3 procedures are used to choose for pure actions. We do not exclude, however,
the possibility of procedures that choose between procedures and procedures that choose
between procedures that choose between procedures etc. Procedures, ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi ), rather
have to be understood as reduced procedures. At any history hxi the explicit probability
distribution associated with a reduced procedure, ρ (ω (hxi )) ∈ P (hxi ), basically subsumes the
probability distributions of procedures of all levels into one explicit distribution deﬁned on
A (hxi ). It is assumed that all players learn the outcome of a reduced procedure directly after
its realization.
We denote a collection of procedures for any player i ∈ N\ {0} that speciﬁes a procedure
for each history after which player i moves a procedural strategy, ωi. A behavioral procedural
strategy, mi ∈ Mi, of player i, on the other hand, has to be understood as an implicit
randomization at each history hxi ∈ Hi over the set of possible procedures Ω (hxi ). Note,
procedural strategies, ωi ∈ Ωi, and behavioral procedural strategies, mi ∈ Mi, in our class of
procedural games are respectively the analogue to pure strategies and mixed strategies in
the traditional extensive form representation. We assume throughout that players choose
for behavioral procedural strategies.
Given a behavioral procedural strategy, mi, for each player i ∈ N\ {0} and the commonly
known system of probability distributions, P = ∪i∈N\{0}Pi, where Pi = ∪hxi ∈HiP (hxi ), we can
compute a probability distribution over endnodes, z ∈ Z. By assigning payoﬀs to endnodes,
we can derive an expected payoﬀ function, πi : Z × P → , for every player i ∈ N\ {0}
which depends on what behavioral procedural proﬁle, m in M, where M = ×N\{0}Mi, is
played. In what follows we will assume that payoﬀs are material payoﬀs like money or any
other measurable quantity of some good.
Summarizing, a procedural game is a tuple:
Γ =
〈
N ,M,P, (πi : Z × P → )N\{0}
〉
. (1)
This concludes the deﬁnition of procedures and the characterization of the class of proce-
dural games which is the basis of our subsequent analysis. Starting from two simple examples,
i.e. Γ1 and Γ2, we have formalized the idea that players choose for procedures rather than
actions. In the remainder of the paper we use this class of procedural games in order to isolate
the impact of procedures on strategic behavior. More precisely, the following section uses
this characterization of procedural games to analyze the impact of procedural choices on the
interaction of reciprocal agents.
Procedural choices and reciprocity
It is easy to see that if agents are only interested in their own expected material payoﬀ,
they would always behave the same in histories representing starting points of identical
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subgames. Looking again at game Γ3 in Figure 3, for example, this means that players
would react the same in histories h42 or h
5
2. However, experimental evidence contradicts
this. For example, in ultimatum games rejection rates for the same proposal signiﬁcantly
decrease if proposals are made by a random draw [Blount (1995) and Bolton et al (2005)]. In
other words proposer behaviors in ultimatum games signiﬁcantly depend on how a certain
proposal has come about. Psychologists have termed this dependence procedural fairness or
procedural concerns and explain the observed behavior with the help of attribution theory.
According to attribution theory agents behave reciprocally and evaluate the (un)kindness of
themselves and others taking into consideration their as well as the others’ possible inﬂuence
on (expected) outcomes. The less inﬂuence people have over outcomes at the time of their
decision the less they are held responsible for it. Therefore, in order to demonstrate how
procedural concerns can theoretically be reconciled with economic theory, we broaden the
behavioral presumption in this section by assuming that agents are reciprocal. This means
we formally deﬁne reciprocity in the context of our procedural game and show how it can
explain the aforementioned evidence on procedural concerns.
Generally speaking, reciprocity means that agents do not only care about their own
material payoﬀ but also about the intentions of others [e.g. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)]. They act kindly or unkindly depending
on whether others are kind or unkind to them. Before we can more formally characterize
the motivation of reciprocal agents and precisely deﬁne kindness and perceived kindness,
however, it is necessary to highlight four theoretical peculiarities: kindness and perceived
kindness of any player towards/from any other player i) cannot be measured directly, ii)
might change after diﬀerent histories of a game, iii) should be unaﬀected by ineﬃcient
procedural strategies and iv) realizations of the moves of chance.
i) Kindness and perceived kindness cannot be measured directly as they depend on
each player’s procedural strategies, beliefs about the others’ procedural strategies and beliefs
about the others’ beliefs. Therefore, to model kindness we assume that every player holds
a belief over the behavioral procedural strategies as well as a belief over the other players’
beliefs. In the spirit of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) we model beliefs as behavioral
procedural strategies, mi ∈ Mi, ∀i ∈ N\ {0}. However, in order to avoid confusion we
introduce a separate notation for beliefs. Let Bij = Mj, ∀i, j ∈ N\ {0} be the set of possible
beliefs of player i about the behavioral procedural strategy of player j (i.e. ﬁrst-order belief).
Furthermore let Cijq = Bjq = Mq, ∀i, j, q ∈ N\ {0} be the set of possible beliefs of player
i about the belief of player j about the behavioral procedural strategy of player q 
= j (i.e.
second-order belief). Obviously, players do not have beliefs about the moves of the player
chance. They do know, however, the explicit probability distributions associated with them.
Therefore, let (a)hx denote the collection of all passed realizations of moves of chance on the
path up to history hx.
ii) Players are assumed to have initial ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs about the other
players. As the game unravels these beliefs might change, however. In order to capture this
it is important to keep track of how each player’s behavior, beliefs, kindness and kindness
perceptions diﬀer across histories. We do this by updating behavioral procedural strategies
as well as ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs at each history that players control. In the spirit
of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) we therefore formally deﬁne an (updated) behavioral
procedural strategy as:
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Definition 2 Let mi ∈ Mi and hxi ∈ Hi, let mi (hxi ) ∈ Mi be the (updated) behavioral
procedural strategy that prescribes the same procedural choices as mi except for the procedural
choices of player i on the path to hxi which are made with probability 1.
In correspondence with the collection of passed realizations of the moves of chance, (a)hxi
,
the collection of passed procedural choices of player i on the path to hxi is denoted (ωi)hxi
.
Hence, the updated behavioral procedural strategy mi (h
x
i ) is identical to (ωi)hxi
on the path
to history hxi and identical to the initial behavioral procedural strategy, mi, in all other
histories. To exemplify consider again game Γ3 in Figure 3. Let player 2’s initial behavioral
procedural strategy m2 be an implicit randomization over his set of pure procedures at each
history that he controls. Player 2 moves after history h52, which means that the implicit
randomization prescribed by his initial behavioral procedural strategy over his pure procedural
choices, ω (h52) and ω
′ (h52), leads to some realization. Following this his updated behavioral
procedural strategy becomes such that the implicit randomization at h52 is substituted by its
realization, but all other procedural choices at histories not reached remain the same. The
updating of beliefs is assumed to work in an analogous fashion. Let, for example, player
2’s initial belief about player 1’s behavioral procedural strategy be b21 = (ω (h
0
1)). If later
on he ﬁnds himself in history h52 in game Γ3, his updated belief about player 1’s behavioral
procedural strategy becomes b21 (h
5
2) = (ω
′ (h01)), where b21 (h
5
2) is player 2’s updated ﬁrst-
order belief in history h52 about player 1’s behavioral procedural strategy. This shows that,
parallel to the deﬁnition of mi (h
x
i ), the updated ﬁrst order belief bij (h
x
i ) is identical to the
passed procedural choices of player j on the path to hxi , (ωj)hxi
, and identical to the initial
belief, bij , in all other histories.
A remark on mixed strategies and procedures. The concept of psychological games was
ﬁrst introduced by Geanakoplos et al.(1989). In their seminal work Geanakoplos et al.(1989)
only allow for initial beliefs to enter utility functions. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
and more recently Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) have shown, however, that in modeling,
for example, reciprocity in a sequential setting unreasonable conclusions might be drawn if
utility functions only depend on initial beliefs.1 They show that it is necessary to keep track
of how beliefs change as play unravels. Two areas in which the updating of beliefs needs some
further explanation are mixed strategies and beliefs in mixed strategies. Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) allow for mixed strategies and also allow players to hold beliefs in mixed
strategies. Mixed strategies in their setting should be interpreted in terms of frequencies
with which pure choices are made in a ‘population’. This interpretation then explains why
players that possibly hold mixed beliefs about the action of some other player update their
beliefs (as soon as they learn his choice) as if he had chosen his actions with probability 1, i.e
intentionally. Procedures, in comparison to that, might assign probabilities to pure actions
in equivalence to mixed strategies. As they are observable, however, players do not update
their beliefs after learning their outcome. If a player, for example, uses the ﬂip of a coin
to take a decision, this is observed by other players. This observability and the fact that
probabilities connected to procedures are common knowledge implies that procedural choices
represent perfect signals about intentions. Consequently, player’s beliefs are updated taking
1For a more detailed discussion of this issue refer to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) and Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004).
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into account the degree with which speciﬁc outcomes are intentionally aimed at. Therefore,
in contrast to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), in our setting players update their beliefs
according to the observed procedural choices that players make.
iii) For the same reason as in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) we restrict our atten-
tion to the set of eﬃcient procedural strategies, Ei. The set of eﬃcient procedural strategies,
Ei, is deﬁned as:
Ei =
{
mi ∈Mi | there exists no m′i ∈Mi such that for all hxi ∈ Hi, (mj)j =i ∈ Πj =iMj,
q ∈ N\ {0} it holds that πq
(
m′i (h
x
i ) , (mj (h
x
i ))j =i
)
≥ πq
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (mj (h
x
i ))j =i
)
with strict inequality for some
(
h, (mj (h
x
i ))j =i , q
)}
.
Strategic choices are ineﬃcient if there exists at least one other choice which conditional
on any history of play and subsequent choices by the others provides no lower material payoﬀ
for any player, and a higher expected material payoﬀ for some player for some history of
play and subsequent choices by the others. In other words any behavioral procedural strategy
is ineﬃcient if it involves ‘wasteful play’ following some history, hxi ∈ Hi. As also pointed
out by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), it is unreasonable to let kindness and perceived
kindness be inﬂuenced by strategies or, in our context, procedural strategies that imply
‘wasteful play’. More precisely, the fact that ‘wasteful play’ is possible should be irrelevant
for drawing conclusions regarding the kindness of the others’ ‘eﬃcient’ choices.2
iv) As said above, kindness and perceived kindness should also be unaﬀected by the
realizations of the move of chance. Intuitively this captures the idea that people are not held
responsible for situations over which they had no control. Or, to put it positively, people are
held responsible for situations in as much as they were/are able to inﬂuence them. To give an
example, if the ticket holder in our introductory situation chose to ﬂip a coin to allocate the
concert ticket to one of his friends, the friends’s kindness perceptions of the ticket holder ’s
choice would depend on his procedural choice even after the realization of the move of chance.
He would not be held responsible for the realization itself as he was not able to inﬂuence it
after he had taken the decision to ﬂip a coin. Similarly, ‘ex ante’ the ticket holder ’s kindness
perception of his own choice is also based only on what he is able to inﬂuence, i.e. he
does not hold himself responsible for the realization of the ﬂip of the coin but only for his
procedural choice. To capture this idea we deﬁne the decision context of a person i in any
history hxi . In every history h
x
i the decision context comprises, ﬁrst, all passed procedural
choices on the path to history hxi , (ω)hxi
, with (ω)hxi
=
{
(ωi)hxi
, ..., (ωN)hxi
}
. Remember,
the knowledge of all passed procedural choices on the path to history hxi is included in the
updated procedural strategies mi (h
x
i ) and the updated ﬁrst order beliefs bij (h
x
i ). Second, the
decision context includes the realizations of the moves of chance on the path up to history
hxi , (a)hxi
, and, third, the remaining explicit probability distributions, (P)¬hxi , where ¬h
x
i
indicates all histories beside the histories on the path up to hxi . Hence, formally speaking:
2For a more detailed discussion of this issue refer to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
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Definition 3 The decision context in any history hxi is a tuple:〈
(ω)hxi
, (a)hxi
, (P)¬hxi
〉
.
This means it is the collection of i) all passed procedural choices of all players on the path to
hxi , (ω)hxi
, ii) all passed realizations of the moves of chance on the path up to hxi , (a)hxi
, and
iii) the unreached explicit probability distributions, (P)¬hxi .
Intuitively speaking the decision context can be understood as the ‘informational back-
ground’ which players use to evaluate their own kindness towards others and, hence, to take
their decisions. It is also the ‘informational background’ which is used by other players in
later stages to evaluate the kindness of passed choices by others. More precisely, the decision
context helps to decide in how far others were consciously aiming at a certain decision, i.e.
pure action, or whether it was by chance that it was chosen.
We can now capture the idea that players strive to be kind if treated kindly and are
unkind if treated unkindly by assuming that every player i ∈ N\ {0} chooses a behavioral
procedural strategy, mi, that maximizes his utility deﬁned as:
Ui = πi +
∑
j =i
Yij · (κij · λiji) , (2)
where i, j ∈ N\ {0}, κij is the believed kindness of player i to player j and λiji is player i’s
belief about the kindness of player j towards himself.
More precisely, player i’s utility is the sum of N terms. The ﬁrst term πi represents player
i’s self interest. It is his expected material payoﬀ in any history hxi after which he moves.
It obviously depends on his own behavioral procedural strategy, mi (h
x
i ), his belief about the
others’ behavioral procedural strategies, bij (h
x
i ) , ∀j 
= i, all past outcomes/realizations of
procedures (a)hxi
until history hxi , and, ﬁnally, on the explicit probability distributions in all
histories that have not been reached yet during the course of the game, (P)¬hx . Hence:
πi = πi
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
.
It can easily be seen that, as we allow for explicit randomizations in our class of procedural
games our deﬁnition of expected material payoﬀs diﬀers from the deﬁnition by Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2005). It takes the player i’s decision context in history hxi into account.
The following N − 1 terms, ∑j =i Yij · (κij · λiji), in equation (2), on the other hand,
represent player i’s reciprocity payoﬀ with respect to each other player j 
= i. The fac-
tor Yij is a non-negative reciprocity parameter which describes player i’s sensitivity to the
(un)kindness of player j. The higher Yij the more sensitive to reciprocity player i is. Finally
the factors κij and λiji capture respectively the kindness of player i to any other player j and
player i’s perceived kindness of player j towards him. Intuitively, kindness κij is positive
or negative depending on whether i is kind or unkind to j and perceived kindness λiji is
positive (negative) if player i beliefs player j to be kind (unkind) to him. Notice, reciprocity
is captured by the factorial speciﬁcation of the kindness parameters, κij and λiji. It drives
players to match perceived kindness (positive λiji) with kindness (positive κij) and perceived
unkindness (negative λiji) with unkindness (negative κij).
This brings us to the formal deﬁnition of kindness, κij:
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Definition 4 The kindness of player i to another player j 
= i at any history hxi ∈ H is
given by the function κij : Mi ×Πj =iBij →  deﬁned as:
κij = πj
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
− πeij
(
(bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
.
The kindness of player i towards player j in history hxi is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the expected material payoﬀ of player j , πj , that player i intends to give j and the average
expected material payoﬀ, πeij
(
(bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
, deﬁned as:
πeij
(
(bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
=
1
2
[
max
{
πj
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
| mi (hxi ) ∈Mi
}
+min
{
πj
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
| mi (hxi ) ∈ Ei
}]
.
Think of πeij as a norm for i describing the ‘equitable’ payoﬀ for player j when i’s beliefs
about the other players’ behavior are summarized by (bij (h
x
i ))j =i, the passed realization on
the path to hxi are (a)hxi
and the unreached explicit probability distributions are given by
(P)¬hx . Thus, when πeij = πj then player i’s kindness towards player j is zero. Intuitively the
above deﬁnition means that player i is kinder the more he expects to give player j relative
to the average that he could give him given his beliefs about the other players play. To
exemplify consider, for example, history h52 of game Γ3. The behavioral procedural strategy
of player 2, m2 (h
5
2), as well as his ﬁrst-order belief over the proﬁle of player 1, b21 (h
5
2),
and the passed realized move of nature, (a)h52
= {(L)}, deﬁne history h52. Furthermore,
player 2’s behavioral procedural strategy together with his ﬁrst-order belief and the remaining
probability distributions, (P)¬hx , on the other hand, deﬁne what player 2 is willing to give
to player 1 in expected terms as well as what he could give him. Assume, for example, that
player 2’s behavioral procedural strategy in h52 is m2 (h
5
2) = (ω (h
4
2) , ω (h
5
2) , ω (h
6
2) , ω (h
7
2)). It
can easily be seen that player 2 intends to give player 1 π1 (h
5
2) = 1800, i.e. according to
m2 (h
5
2) he will choose ω (h
5
2) after his history h
5
2. On the other hand, the average of the
maximum and minimum which he could give to player 1 is πe21 (h
5
2) =
1
2
(1800)+ 1
2
(0) = 900.
Hence, player 2’s kindness towards player 1 in h52 is:
κ21
(
h52
)
= π1
(
h52
)− πe21 (h52) = 1800− 900
= 900.
The above deﬁnition of kindness is a necessary adaptation from Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004) in the context of our procedural game. It includes the decision context on
which players base their decisions.
The deﬁnition of perceived kindness, λiji, also requires a change though. As said above,
in the evaluation of intentions agents take into account in how far others were/are actually
responsible for the unraveled play. Hence, it would be unreasonable to assume that player 2
in game Γ3 perceived the kindness of player 1 in histories h
5
2 and h
6
2 diﬀerently. It is simply
by chance that either of the two histories are reached. In order to capture this we assume
that players always evaluate the other players’ kindness on the basis of the decision context
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in which the others have taken their last procedural choice. Remember, a decision context
characterizes the ‘informational base’ on which a decision is taken. As players know all
passed procedural choices as well as the realizations of moves of chance along the path up
to hxi , they obviously not only know their own current decision context, but they can also
deduce all passed decision contexts which were the basis of the other players’ last procedural
choices. Denote the history in which any player j 
= i has made his last procedural choice
along the path up to hxi as h
x
i
(
hlj
)
. When player i evaluates the kindness of player j’s
procedural choice in history hxi , he, hence, uses player j’s decision context in h
x
i
(
hlj
)
:
〈
(ω)hxi (hlj)
, (a)hxi (hlj)
, (P)¬hxi (hlj)
〉
,
where (ω)hxi (hlj)
deﬁnes all passed procedural choices on the path to hxi up to history h
l
j ,
(a)hxi (hlj)
deﬁnes all passed realizations of moves of chance on the path to history hxi up to
history hlj and (P)¬hxi (hlj) indicates all remaining explicit randomizations in h
l
j. Evaluating
player j’s kindness only on the basis of the decision context in which he has made his last
procedural choice on the path up to history hxi ensures that player j is held solely responsible
for the decisions that he has explicitly taken himself. To exemplify, in both histories h52 and
h62 player 2 evaluates player 1’s kindness on the basis of player 1’s decision context at the
history, h01:〈
(ω)h52(h01)
, (a)h52(h01)
, (P)¬h52(h01)
〉
=
〈
(ω)h62(h01)
, (a)h62(h01)
, (P)¬h62(h01)
〉
,
in which player 1 had to take his last procedural decision, i.e. hlj = h
0
1. In other words, in
histories h52 and h
6
2 player 2 does not take the realization of the move of chance after history
h20 into account when evaluating the kindness of player 1. The realization of the move of
chance after h20 is by chance and hence not the responsibility of player 1.
Given this let perceived kindness be deﬁned as:
Definition 5 Player i’s beliefs about how kind player j 
= i is to i at history hxi ∈ H is given
by the function λiji : Bij ×Πi=jCiji →  deﬁned as:
λiji = πi
(
bij (h
x
i ) , (cijq (h
x
i ))q =j , (a)hxi (hlj) , (P)¬hxi (hlj)
)
−πeji
(
(ciji (h
x
i ))i=j , (a)hxi (hlj) , (P)¬hxi (hlj)
)
,
where hxi
(
hlj
)
is the last history after which player j has moved on the path to hxi .
As one can see, similar to the deﬁnition of kindness also perceived kindness is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between what player i beliefs to receive in expected material payoﬀ relative
to the average that he could have gotten. To exemplify, assume now again that players ﬁnd
themselves in history h52 of game Γ3. We have seen above that, given player 2’s updated
behavioral procedural strategy, his ﬁrst-order belief and the past realizations of the moves of
chance up to history h52, player 2’s kindness towards player 1 is 900 in h
5
2. In addition to player
2’s updated ﬁrst-order belief b21 (h
5
2) = (ω
′ (h01)), let now player 2’s updated second order
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belief be c212 (h
5
2) = (ω (h
4
2) , ω (h
5
2) , ω (h
6
2) , ω (h
7
2)). The kindness that player 2 perceives
from player 1 is then given by:
λ212
(
h52
)
= π2
(
b21
(
h52
)
, c212
(
h52
)
, (a)h52(h01)
, (P)¬h52(h01)
)
−πe12
(
c212
(
h52
)
, (a)h52(h01)
, (P)¬h52(h01)
)
=
(
1
2
(1800) +
1
2
(200)
)
− 1
2
((1800) + (200))
= 0.
This means, player 2 has the impression in history h52 that player 1 intends to give him
π2 (h
5
2) = 1000. As 1000 is also the ‘equitable’ payoﬀ that player 1 could have given to
him, player 2 judges player 1’s kindness to be 0. Now consider history h42, on the other
hand, which is the starting point of an identical subgame. Player 2’s perceived kindness of
player 1’s behavioral procedural strategy given his updated beliefs, b21 (h
4
2) = (ω1 (h
0
1)) and
c212 (h
4
2) = (ω (h
4
2) , ω (h
5
2) , ω (h
6
2) , ω (h
7
2)) is:
λ212
(
h42
)
= π2
(
b21
(
h42
)
, c212
(
h42
)
, (a)h42(h01)
, (P)¬h42(h01)
)
−πe12
(
c212
(
h42
)
, (a)h42(h01)
, (P)¬h42(h01)
)
= (200)− 1
2
((1800) + (200))
= −800.
Hence, although h42 and h
5
2 are starting points of identical subgames, players perceives the
situations totally diﬀerent, i.e. perceived kindness of 0 in h52 vs. perceived kindness of −800
in h42. It follows that as both histories are perceived diﬀerently, optimal reactions in one
history might not be optimal in the other even though the subsequent situation seems to be
the same. This exempliﬁes that reciprocal agents do care about the way a certain situation
has come about or, in other words, reciprocity inherently leads to procedural concerns.
This completes the description of the reciprocal preferences in the context of our proce-
dural game. Putting together the procedural game, Γ, as deﬁned in (1) and the vector of
utilities, (Ui)i∈N\{0}, as deﬁned in (2) we get a tuple
Γp =
〈
Γ, (Ui)i∈N\{0}
〉
. (3)
We refer to Γp as a procedural game with reciprocity preferences. Note, as the ‘psychological
game with reciprocity preferences’ deﬁned by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) Γp is not
a ‘traditional game’. In line with Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), utility functions, Ui,
are deﬁned on richer domains including subjective beliefs. Diﬀerent to them, however, and
also diﬀerent to ‘traditional games’ agents in our setting choose for procedures, as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition (1), rather than actions and strategies.
As a solution concept for our class of procedural games with reciprocity preferences we
propose the sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) deﬁned by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004). This means, each player in each history chooses his optimal procedure given his
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beliefs. The players’ initial ﬁrst and second order beliefs are required to be correct, and
following each history of play the beliefs are updated as explained above.
LetMi (hxi , m) be the non-empty set of behavioral procedural strategies that prescribe, for
each player i ∈ N\ {0}, the same choices as the strategy mi (hxi ) for all histories other than
hxi . Given this, the sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) in the context of our procedural
game with reciprocity preferences is deﬁned as:
Definition 6 The proﬁle m∗ = (m∗i )i∈N\{0} is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) if
for all i ∈ N\ {0} and for each history hxi ∈ H it holds that
1. m∗i (h
x
i ) ∈
argmaxmi∈Mi(hxi ,m) Ui
(
mi (h
x
i ) ,
(
bij (h
x
i ) , (cijq (h
x
i ))q =j
)
j =i
, (a)hxi
, (P)¬hxi
)
,
2. bij = m
∗
j for all j 
= i,
3. cijq = m
∗
q for all j 
= i, q 
= j.
Condition 1 assures that a SRE is a strategy proﬁle such that at history hxi player i makes
choices which maximize his utility given his beliefs and given that he follows his equilibrium
strategy at other histories. At the initial stage, conditions (2) and (3) guarantee that the
initial beliefs are correct. At any subsequent history, condition (1) requires that beliefs assign
probability one to the sequence of choices that deﬁne that history, but are otherwise as the
initial beliefs.
Concluding, in this section we have formally deﬁned the motivation of reciprocal agents
in the context of our procedural game and have given a glimpse of the impact of procedural
choices on the strategic interaction of reciprocal agents. In the following section we will
more fully analyze the impact of procedural choices by applying the concept of the sequential
reciprocity equilibrium to two examples.
Applications
The ﬁrst application is the ‘Sequential Prisoners Dilemma’ also analyzed by Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004). The second is the ‘So Long, Sucker’ game in the spirit of Nalebuﬀ
and Shubik (1988) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Note, a full description of the
strategic interaction and all possible equilibria that might arise in these two situations is
beyond the scope of this paper. We, therefore, limit the analysis to the characterization
of only one equilibrium to demonstrate the impact and importance of procedural concerns.
Results and intuitions are presented in this section, mathematical proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
Example 1: Sequential Prisoners Dilemma
Consider the Sequential Prisoners Dilemma in Figure 4:1
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Figure 4: Game Γ4
As can easily be seen, game Γ4 is an adaptation of the sequential prisoners dilemma
analyzed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). The diﬀerence is that in Γ4 player 1
cannot only choose to cooperate (c) and defect (d), but can also explicitly randomize by
choosing procedure (r). One sequential reciprocity equilibrium is:
Result 1 If player 1’s and 2’s sensitivity to reciprocity, Y1 and Y2, is such that
0 < Y1 <
1
2
and
Y2 >
1
4α2 − 3
and player 1’s procedure r (h01) is associated with an explicit probability distribution such that
1 > α2 >
3
4
, then the SRE is given by player 1 choosing r (h01) in history h
0
1 and player 2
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choosing c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) and d (h
7
2) in histories h
4
2, h
5
2, h
6
2 and h
7
2 respectively.
3
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition is the following. If α2 is such that 1 > α2 >
3
4
, player 2 perceives player
1’s procedural choice as kind. If, in addition, his sensitivity to reciprocity Y2 is high enough,
i.e. Y2 >
1
4α2−3 , then he reciprocates player 1’s kindness by choosing (c) in history h
6
2. At
the same time player 2 punishes player 1 in equilibrium at history h72 which is the starting
point of a payoﬀ equivalent subgame. The diﬀerence between histories h62 and h
7
2 is that the
explicit probability α2 is such that player 2 perceives player 1’s choice of (r) as kind. He
does not attribute enough responsibility for the outcome, i.e. history h62, to player 1 to make
it worth while to punish him. Furthermore, since Y1 is relatively small, player 1 is mainly
interested by money and his expected monetary payoﬀ is highest by playing (r) given that
player 2 does not play (d) following player 1’s choice of (r).
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), on the other hand, showed in the context of their
setting that if player 2’s sensitivity to reciprocity is strong enough, he cooperates if player
1 cooperates and defects if player 1 defects. Furthermore, they showed that if player 1’s
sensitivity to reciprocity is low and player 2’s sensitivity is high, cooperation is player 1’s
equilibrium behavior for both monetary and reciprocity reasons.
Comparing the results shows that their equilibrium predictions are very sensitive to the
availability of other procedures to take the same decision. As player 1 can also use procedure
(r) to take his decision cooperation is no longer his optimal action given that player 2
is very sensitive to reciprocity. He chooses (r) because this makes player 2 to cooperate
even in history h62 which is identical to the subgame starting in h
7
2. Hence, procedural
choices inﬂuence the kindness and perceived kindness of players and therefore inﬂuence
the interaction of reciprocal agents.
Example 2: The ‘So Long, Sucker’ Game
In the following we will apply the concept of the sequential reciprocity equilibrium to the
example, Γ5, in Figure 5.
1 Example Γ5 is an adaptation of the ‘So Long, Sucker’ game also
analyzed by Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). With
ε = 0, Γ5 is a strategic situation in which player 1 has to decide on whom of two other
players to give a zero payoﬀ. Following his decision, the player who was unfavorably treated
is called upon to decide whether player 1 should get 3 or whether both the others should
equally get a payoﬀ of 1. Intuitively it looks as if player 1 is ‘a priori’ worst oﬀ, as whoever
he chooses will feel badly treated, and hence take revenge on player 1 by giving him the
lowest possible monetary payoﬀ.
3For simplicity we denote the sensitivity of reciprocity as Yi in example 1. In example 2 we stick to Yij
as deﬁned in equation (2) to avoid confusion.
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Figure 5: Game Γ6
However, if all players are solely motivated by purely selﬁsh monetary concerns, this
outcome is not guaranteed, as players 2 and 3 are indiﬀerent between all their choices given
that ε = 0. In order to allow for the possibility of revenge, Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988) depart
from the usual selﬁshness assumption, and assume that the players have lexicographically
ordered objectives. This means that each player primarily maximizes his monetary payoﬀ,
but in case some choices yield exactly the same monetary payoﬀ ties are broken so as to
allow a player to take revenge. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), on the other hand,
show that if agents behave reciprocally this outcome is also guaranteed for ε ≥ 0. More
precisely, they show that for any ε ≥ 0 there exist sensitivities to reciprocity Y21 > 0 and
Y31 > 0 for which taking revenge on player 1 is the best alternative for player 2 and 3. As
said above, if players 2 and 3 are willing to take revenge even if it is costly, it seems that
player 1 is trapped, as whatever he does, his action is perceived unkind by the player who
has to take the subsequent decision.
As in the Sequential Prisoners Dilemma also in this application these results crucially
depend on the fact that players 2 and 3 attribute full intentionality to player 1. In other
words, Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988)’s and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s result is
contingent on the unavailability of other procedures for player 1 to resolve the conﬂict between
him and the other players. Consider game Γ6 in Figure 6:
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Figure 6: Game Γ6
As can easily be seen, the only diﬀerence between games Γ5 and Γ6 lies in the fact that
in the latter player 1 cannot only take his decision directly but can also e.g. ﬂip a coin, i.e.
choose ω′1 (h
0
1), to take it. Hence, he has an additional procedure which he can use to take
his decision. It can be shown that with the help of this procedure player 1 can avoid the
conﬂict with the others. More precisely:
Result 2 If player 1, 2 and 3 have a sensitivity to reciprocity of
Y12 = Y13 ≥ 0,
Y21 ≥ ε
ε + 1
and
Y31 ≥ ε
ε + 1
,
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then the only equilibrium is given by players 2 and 3 playing
(
ω′2
(
h42
)
, ω2
(
h52
))
and (
ω′3
(
h63
)
, ω2
(
h73
))
respectively and player 1 choosing ω′1 (h
0
1).
This means, if players 2 and 3 are enough sensitive to reciprocity, they will punish player
1, if he chooses one of them directly, and will be kind to him, if he chooses to take the
decision by e.g. ‘ﬂipping a coin’. Knowing this, player 1 will choose to ﬂip a coin, given
that his sensitivity to reciprocity is equal for players 2 and 3, as this gives him a higher
monetary as well as reciprocity payoﬀ. In other words, by choosing e.g. to ﬂip a coin, player
1 can get out of his ‘trap’. Players 2 and 3 respectively perceive player 1’s procedural strategy
ω1 (h
0
1) , ω
′′
1 (h
0
1) as unkind and ω
′
1 (h
0
1) as kind. If player 1 chooses e.g. to ﬂip a coin, they
do not attribute the outcome of the randomization to player 1, as he is only responsible for
choosing the procedure but not for the outcome itself. Player 1, on the other hand, chooses
ω′1 (h
0
1) for monetary as well as reciprocity reasons.
This highlights ones more how procedural choices inﬂuence the strategic interaction of
reciprocal agents.
Conclusion
As we have seen, any decision in human interactions is inherently associated with a procedure
which characterizes the way in which the decision is taken. This means it is impossible to
take a decision without deciding on how to take it. It is widely accepted in other scientiﬁc
disciplines and it has been shown experimentally that people react diﬀerently to identical
outcomes depending on the procedures which have led to them. Hence, people are concerned
about the way in which decisions are taken. Nevertheless economic theory has so far neglected
the impact of procedural choices on human interaction. It has ignored procedural concerns as
traditional economic theory is based on consequentialist preferences. However, if preferences
are solely outcome oriented, it can hardly be explained why people should react diﬀerently
to ‘outcomewise’ identical situations which only diﬀer in the procedures which have led to
them.
Only in recent years theories of reciprocity have contested the consequentialist view in
economic theory by assuming that agents also receive a psychological payoﬀ which, broadly
speaking, depends on the agents’ perceived intentions of others. As said before, when people
behave reciprocally they evaluate the intentions of others and reciprocate kind with kind
and unkind with unkind behavior. The evaluation of intentions is implicitly connected to
the assignment of responsibilities for outcomes. The assignment of responsibilities, in turn,
is related to the amount of control that people have over outcomes. It has been shown
in our paper that procedural choices inﬂuence the control that people have over outcomes
and, hence, inﬂuence the attribution of responsibilities and the evaluation of intentions.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s theory of sequential reciprocity captures situations in
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which agents have full control over outcomes and, hence, are held fully responsible for all
consequences of their actions. In contrast to this, in our class of procedural games agents
can choose between diﬀerent procedures, which diﬀer in the probabilities that they assign to
outcomes. Given this we show, in line with attribution theory, that the less inﬂuence people
have on outcomes the less responsibility and intentionality is attributed to them.
By deﬁning a class of procedural games we have been able to distinguishing between proce-
dures which are used to take decisions and the decisions themselves. Furthermore, assuming
reciprocal agents and deﬁning the decision context as the ‘informational background’ which
any decision is based upon, we have demonstrated that procedural concerns are actually an
inherent feature of any interaction of reciprocal agents.
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Appendix
Proof to result (1):
In this proof we show under what conditions the behavior as deﬁned in Result (1) is the
equilibrium behavior. Note, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition (6) we assume that players’ beliefs are
correct. Given this, we analyze under what conditions they can be sustained in equilib-
rium. It can easily be seen that if player 2’s second order belief about player 1’s belief is
(c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) , d (h
7
2)), then player 2’s believed equitable payoﬀ is π
e1
2 =
1
2
(1)+ 1
2
(0) =
1
2
. Hence, player 2’s perceived kindness if player 1 chooses c (h01) is
λ212
(
h42
)
= 1− 1
2
=
1
2
,
where 1 is player 2’s expected monetary payoﬀ and 1
2
his equitable payoﬀ given his second
order belief.
Secondly, if player 1 plays r (h01) player 2’s perceived kindness of player 1’s procedural
choice is
λ212
(
h52
)
= λ212
(
h62
)
= α2 (1) + (1− α2) (−1)− 1
2
= 2α2 − 3
2
, (4)
and, thirdly, if player 1 plays d (h01), it is
λ212
(
h72
)
= 0− 1
2
= −1
2
.
From equation (4) it can directly be seen that player 2 perceives player 1’s procedural choice
r (h01) as kind or unkind depending on α2. If α2 >
3
4
then player 1’s choice of r (h01) is
perceived as kind. Therefore,
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Remark 1 If α2 is such that
1 > α2 >
3
4
,
then player 2 perceives player 1’s procedural choice r (h01) as kind.
Henceforth we assume that player 1’s procedure r (h01) is associated with an explicit
probability distribution α2 >
3
4
.
We said before that player 1’s ﬁrst order belief is (c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) , d (h
7
2)). Further-
more, we said that in equilibrium this belief has to be correct. Hence, under what condition
do we expect player 2 to choose c (h42) following player 1’s choice of c (h
0
1)? By playing c (h
4
2)
player 2 receives the following utility
u2
(
c
(
h42
))
= 1 + Y2 (1)
(
1
2
)
,
where κ21 (c (h
4
2)) = 1− 12 ((1) + (−1)) = 1 is player 2’s kindness to player 1 by playing c (h42).
On the other hand, by playing d (h42) player 2’s utility is
u2
(
d
(
h42
))
= 2 + Y2 (−1)
(
1
2
)
,
where κ21 (d (h
4
2)) = −1− 12 ((1) + (−1)) = −1. Hence player 2 plays c (h42) in history h42 if
1 + Y2 (1)
(
1
2
)
≥ 2 + Y2 (−1)
(
1
2
)
.
This reduces to
Y2 ≥ 1.
This shows that if player 1 plays c (h01), player 2 plays c (h
4
2) if Y2 ≥ 1.
Remark 2 If player 1 plays c (h01), player 2 plays c (h
4
2) if Y2 ≥ 1.
Going back to player 1’s ﬁrst order belief, under what conditions do we expect player 2
to choose d (h72) following player 1’s choice of d (h
0
1)?
In history h72 it is easy to see that player 2’s monetary and reciprocity payoﬀ induce him
to chooses d (h72) for all Y2 ≥ 0. Hence, if player 1 plays d (h01), player 2 plays d (h72) if Y2 ≥ 0.
Remark 3 If player 1 plays d (h01), player 2 plays d (h
4
2) if Y2 ≥ 0.
Finally, under what conditions do we expect player 2 to choose c (h52) in h
5
2 and c (h
6
2)
in h62 following player 1’s choice of r (h
0
1)?
Assume that player 1 has chosen r (h01). Doing the analogous calculations as above for
player 2’s behavior in history h52 one can see that player 2 plays c (h
5
2) in h
5
2 if
1 + Y2 (1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ 2 + Y2 (−1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
,
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where the lhs is u2 (c (h
5
2)) and the rhs is u2 (d (h
5
2)). The above reduces to
Y2 ≥ 1
4α2 − 3 .
Note, as α2 >
3
4
we know that Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 > 1. This shows that any player 2 with Y2 ≥ 14α2−3
would play c (h42) in history h
4
2 and c (h
5
2) in history h
5
2. Finally, in history h
6
2 the analogous
calculations as in h52 and h
4
2 are
−1 + Y2 (1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ 0 + Y2 (−1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
,
where the lhs is u2 (c (h
6
2)) and the rhs is u2 (d (h
6
2)). The above also reduces to
Y2 ≥ 1
4α2 − 3 .
Hence, also here it holds that if Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 player 2 plays c (h62) in history h62.
Remark 4 If player 1 plays r (h01), player 2 plays c (h
5
2) in h
5
2 and c (h
6
2) in h
6
2 if Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 .
Concluding, as we have seen above, if Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 , it holds that player 2’ equilibrium
behavior is characterized by c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) and d (h
7
2) in histories h
4
2, h
5
2, h
6
2 and h
7
2
respectively.
Let us now turn to player 1. Player 1’s perceived kindness of player 2’s equilibrium
procedural strategy is
λ121
(
h01
)
= (q + 2q′ − q′α2)− (1− q′α2 − q)
= 2q + 2q′ − 1,
where q and q′ are player 1’s second order beliefs associated with his procedures c (h01) and
r (h01). His kindness to player 2, on the other hand, is
κ12
(
c
(
h01
))
= 1− 1
2
=
1
2
,
by playing c (h01),
κ12
(
r
(
h01
))
= α2 − (1− α)− 1
2
= 2α2 − 3
2
,
by playing r (h01) and
κ12
(
c
(
h01
))
= 0− 1
2
= −1
2
,
by playing d (h01).
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Putting the pieces together one can see that player 1 chooses r (h01) in equilibrium if
for q′ = 1 and q = 0 two conditions hold: i) u1 (r (h01)) ≥ u1 (c (h01)) and ii) u1 (r (h01)) ≥
u1 (d (h
0
1)). The ﬁrst condition boils down to
(2− α2) + Y1
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ (1) + Y1
(
1
2
)
,
which reduces to
Y1 ≤ 1
2
.
The second condition furthermore boils down to
(2− α2) + Y1
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ (0) + Y1
(
−1
2
)
,
which holds for all Y1 ≥ 0. Hence, given player 2’s behavior, the equilibrium behavior of
player 1 is characterized by r (h01) if 0 < Y1 ≤ 12 .
Remark 5 Given player 2’s equilibrium behavior (c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) , d (h
7
2)), player 1 plays
r (h01) if 0 < Y1 ≤ 12 .
In other words, if player 2’s sensitivity to reciprocity is high and player 1’s is not too
strong, the equilibrium behavior for both players is player 1 choosing the procedure r (h01)
and player 2 choosing (c (h52) , c (h
6
2)) in response. This concludes the proof of Result (1).
Proof to result (2):
In analogy to the aforementioned proof, we ﬁrst show under what conditions (ω′2 (h
4
2) , ω2 (h
5
2))
and (ω′3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3)) simultaneously represent the equilibrium behavior of players 2 and 3.
Then, secondly, we show the conditions for which it is best for player 1 to choose ω′1 (h
0
1),
given the behavior of players 2 and 3.
If (ω′2 (h
4
2) , ω2 (h
5
2)) and (ω
′
3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3)) are player 2’s and 3’s procedural strategies, then
the most and least that player 1 can give to player 2 and 3 is either 1 or −ε. Hence, it can
easily be seen that the perceived kindness of player 2 and 3 in either of the four histories h42,
h52, h
6
3, h
7
2 is:
λ212
(
h42
)
= λ313
(
h73
)
= −ε− 1
2
(1− ε)
= −1
2
(1 + ε) ,
λ212
(
h52
)
= λ212
(
h63
)
= λ313
(
h52
)
= λ313
(
h63
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
(1− ε)
=
1
2
ε,
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and
λ212
(
h73
)
= λ313
(
h42
)
= 1− 1
2
(1− ε)
=
1
2
(1 + ε) ,
where πe12 = π
e1
3 =
1
2
(1− ε). In other words, if player 1 chooses ω1 (h01) player 2 perceives
this as unkind and player 3 as kind. On the other hand, if player 1 chooses ω′′1 (h
0
1), player 2
perceives this as kind and player 3 as unkind. Furthermore, if player 1 takes his decision by
ﬂipping a coin, i.e. ω′1 (h
0
1), then both players do not perceive this as unkind as ε ≥ 0.
Remark 6 Player 2 perceives player 1’s procedural choice of ω1 (h
0
1) as unkind. Likewise,
player 3 perceives player 1’s procedural choice ω′′1 (h
0
1) as unkind. On the other hand, both
player do not perceive player 1’s choice ω′1 (h
0
1) as unkind.
Consider now all histories in turn. Looking at history h42 after which player 2 has to
choose one can see that player 2 can either show a kindness of
κ12
(
ω2
(
h42
))
= 3− 1
2
(3 + 1)
= 1
by playing ω2 (h
4
2) or he can show a kindness of
κ12
(
ω′2
(
h42
))
= 1− 1
2
(3 + 1)
= −1
by playing ω′2 (h
4
2). Obviously, player 2’s behavior in history h
4
2 in general also creates some
(un)kindness towards player 3. In our case, however, 3’s monetary payoﬀ is invariant to
player 2’s choice in h42. Hence, player 2’s kindness towards player 3 is 0 in h
4
2. Given this,
the utilities from either of player 2’s choices are
u2
(
ω2
(
h42
))
= (0) + Y21 (1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
,
and
u2
(
ω′2
(
h42
))
= (−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
.
Again in equilibrium player 2 chooses the latter if u2 (ω
′
2 (h
4
2)) ≥ u2 (ω2 (h42)). This can be
written as
(−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
≥ (0) + Y21 (1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
,
which reduces to
Y21 ≥ ε
ε + 1
.
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This means if Y21 ≥ εε+1 then player 2 takes revenge on player 1 by choosing ω′2 (h42) in history
h42. From the symmetry of the game it necessarily also follows that everything which holds
for player 2 in history h42 also holds for player 3 in history h
7
3. In other words if
Y31 ≥ ε
ε + 1
,
then player 3 takes revenge on player 1 in history h73 by playing ω
′
3 (h
7
3).
Remark 7 Players 2 and 3 take revenge on player 1 by playing ω′2 (h
4
2) in h
4
2 and ω
′
3 (h
7
3) in
h73 respectively, if Y21, Y31 ≥ εε+1 .
Turning now to histories h52 and h
6
2 one can see that due to the symmetry of the situation
both players, 2 and 3, perceive player 1’s kindness identically. Therefore, in history h52 player
2’s utilities from choosing either of his procedures is
u2
(
ω2
(
h52
))
= (0) + Y21 (1)
(
1
2
ε
)
and
u2
(
ω′2
(
h52
))
= (−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
1
2
ε
)
.
He chooses ω2 (h
5
2) rather than ω
′
2 (h
5
2) if u2 (ω2 (h
5
2)) ≥ u2 (ω′2 (h52)), i.e.
(0) + Y21 (1)
(
1
2
ε
)
≥ (−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
1
2
ε
)
,
which reduces to
Y21 ≥ −1.
Note, this holds for all Y21 ≥ 0. Again, for equal reasons also player 3 chooses ω3 (h63) rather
than ω′2 (h
6
3) in history h
6
3 if Y21 ≥ 0.
Remark 8 If player 2’s and 3’s sensitivity to reciprocity is
Y21 ≥ 0,
and
Y31 ≥ 0,
then they respectively choose ω2 (h
5
2) and ω3 (h
6
3) in histories h
5
2 and h
6
3 following player 1’s
choice of ω′1 (h
0
1).
Concluding, if Y21 ≥ εε+1 and Y31 ≥ εε+1 then players 2 and 3 play (ω′2 (h42) , ω2 (h52)) and
(ω′3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3)) in their histories h
4
2, h
5
2 and h
6
3, h
7
3 respectively.
Given this under what conditions is it best for player 1 to choose ω′1 (h
0
1)? Assume for
simplicity that player 1’s sensitivity to reciprocity is equal towards both, player 2 and 3. In
other words, assume that Y12 = Y13 = Y . Denote player 1’s second order beliefs about player
2’s and 3’s beliefs p2, p
′
2 and (1− p2 − p′2) as well as p3, p′3 and (1− p3 − p′3). More precisely,
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let pi and p
′
i be player 1’s belief about the probabilities that any player i ∈ {2, 3} attaches
to player 1’s procedures ω1 (h
0
1) and ω
′
1 (h
0
1) respectively. Therefore, player 1’s perceived
kindness from player 2’s and 3’s procedural strategies is
λ121 = p2 (−1) + p′2
(
1
2
(1) +
1
2
(0)
)
+ (1− p2 − p′2) (0)
= p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2,
and
λ131 = p3 (0) + p
′
3
(
1
2
(0) +
1
2
(1)
)
+ (1− p3 − p′3) (−1)
= p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
Player 1’s kindness, on the other hand, towards player 2 and 3 is given by κ12 (ω1 (h
0
1)) =
κ13 (ω
′′
1 (h
0
1)) = −12 (1 + ε), κ13 (ω1 (h01)) = κ12 (ω′′1 (h01)) = 12 (1 + ε) and κ12 (ω′1 (h01)) =
κ13 (ω
′
1 (h
0
1)) =
1
2
ε.
Hence, given that players 2 and 3 choose (ω′2 (h
4
2) , ω2 (h
5
2)) and (ω
′
3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3)) the
utilities from all of player 1’s procedural choices can be written as
u1
(
ω1
(
h01
))
= 1 + Y
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2
)
+Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
)
by playing ω1 (h
0
1),
u1
(
ω′1
(
h01
))
= 3 + Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2
)
+Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
)
by playing ω′1 (h
0
1) and
u1
(
ω′′1
(
h01
))
= 1 + Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2
)
+Y
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
)
by playing ω′′1 (h
0
1).
Obviously, player 1 plays ω′1 (h
0
1) if u1 (ω
′
1 (h
0
1)) ≥ u1 (ω1 (h01)) and u1 (ω′1 (h01)) ≥ u1 (ω′′1 (h01))
with p2 = p3 = 0, p
′
2 = p
′
3 = 1 and p
′′
2 = p
′′
3 = 0. The ﬁrst of the two conditions can be
written as
3 + Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
+ Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
≥ 1− Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
+ Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
,
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which holds for all Y > 0. Secondly, it has to hold that
3 + Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
+ Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
≥ 1 + Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
− Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
,
which is identical to the above. Hence, whenever Y = Y12 = Y13 > 0 it holds that player 1’s
best response to player 2’s and 3’s procedural strategy (ω′2 (h
4
2) , ω2 (h
5
2)) and (ω
′
3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3))
is to play ω′1 (h
0
1).
Remark 9 Given player 2’s and 3’s equilibrium play, player 1 chooses procedure ω′1 (h
0
1), if
Y = Y12 = Y13 > 0.
This concludes the proof of Result (2).
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